

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 April 1949

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 144

SUBJECT: Soviet-Communist Capabilities for Sabotage in 52 Listed Countries.

1. Problem: We have been asked to estimate the broad Soviet-Communist capabilities for significant sabotage in 52 listed countries.
2. The estimates are given in the requested form of a categorical statement briefly substantiated.
3. Capabilities have been taken to be those existing at the present time, but in making estimates a context of approaching hostilities has been assumed.
4. No account has been taken of the incidence of individual acts of sabotage -- either by fanatics or trained agents. It is considered that such attempts must be regarded as possible wherever desirable targets exist. Special concentrations of industry in otherwise predominantly agricultural countries, and economic pressures which make it possible readily to buy saboteurs, are emphasized.
5. It is to be noted that the capabilities described will increase

Note: Except as noted the estimates given have been informally coordinated and agreed with the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State. The cases of Bolivia, Colombia, Caracas, Ecuador, Guatemala, [REDACTED] Trinidad, it has been impossible to reach complete agreement within the deadline.

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Date: 15/11/77 By: 011

or decrease as certain sources of social tension develop or are resolved.

(a) In industrial and semi-industrialized countries, these tensions tend to occur in connection with wages, living costs, conditions of work, and the distribution of social benefits.

(b) In colonial, semi-colonial, and formerly colonial regions, these tensions tend to occur in connection with indigenous nationalist movements and latent racial antagonisms.

6. Consequently, the estimates given will need periodic re-examination if they are to retain their validity.

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NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA

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COSTA RICA: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

The Communist Party, outlawed in 1948, has had its effective strength cut down to about 2,000 and its discipline impaired. It remains, however, potent in the Worker's Confederation and could interfere with power plants, railroads, tele-communications, and port facilities. Security forces, though considered adequate under existing conditions, would need reorganization to deal with a concerted determined effort.

CUBA: Sabotage definitely to be expected.

The Communist Party is one of the largest, best-organized, and best-disciplined in Latin America. It has a nucleus of about 55,000 militants and counts on a popular vote of about 150,000. Its leaders are experienced and able. It has a party press and numerous "front" organizations. Its major weapon is its influence in organized labor. Sabotage would include two types of operation: (1) indirect sabotage by slow-down and strikes; (2) direct action against facilities considered vital to the US. Security forces are considered able ultimately to control an organized sabotage attempt, though not before considerable damage will have been done.

*GUATEMALA: Sabotage probably to be expected.

There are relatively few Communist Party members in Guatemala. Severely repressed between 1932 - 1944, the Party lacks experienced and disciplined membership. However, the present administration is susceptible to Communist influence exerted through "front organizations," particularly those of labor. The government has definitely tended to side with labor in disputes between management and labor. Though the Communists could do little in the way of direct significant sabotage, their capacity for indirect sabotage by way of prolonging labor difficulties and strikes, against which the government would not take vigorous action, is a positive capability. Its use is accordingly probable.

* Department of State estimates "Sporadic sabotage only."

HAITI: Sporadic sabotage only.

The Communist Party was outlawed in 1948, and all suspected Communists have since been kept under surveillance. There are some Communists among the sisal workers and they strongly influence or dominate certain workers unions. Government control is firm and no significant organized sabotage, or even indirect sabotage through strikes are likely to develop.

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HONDURAS: No sabotage indicated.

There are few known Communists in the country, and almost all who have come into the country in the past have been effectively eliminated from the local scene.

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PANAMA: (excluding Canal Zone) Sporadic sabotage only.

(NB: This estimate assumes that planned US counter-measures become operative as required. It excludes expected direct sabotage attempts by trained saboteurs.)

The capacity of Panamanian Communists for significant sabotage is strictly limited. They lack experienced leadership. The basic orientation of the present government is anti-USSR and pro-US. Existing security plans are considered adequate to check local attempts physically to damage Panamanian installations. Indirect sabotage in the form of strikes, slow-downs, etc. are not expected to be more than sporadic.

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SOUTH AMERICA

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ARGENTINA: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

The Communist Party, though not large numerically, is reinforced by about 90,000 Slavs who are members of Union Eslava, a Soviet-sponsored "front" organization. In addition it has experienced leaders and a fairly large number of sympathizers. It is well provided with press organs. Its strength is centered in the Federal Capital and Province of Buenos Aires. It has lost ground in the labor movement generally, but still has particular influence among railway, port, and meat-packing workers and also through "front" organizations. It would be extremely difficult to ensure full protection to industrial plants and other strategic installations against a determined Communist organization. Nevertheless, the security forces of the Peron government are considered well able to deal with a moderate sabotage effort.

BRAZIL: Sabotage probably to be expected.

The Communist Party, although outlawed in 1947, still has an estimated membership of about 175,000. Its leadership is still organized and in control of the Party's activities. Its strength is concentrated in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco. Its influence is particularly strong among manganese miners, port, transportation and electrical power workers. Social and economic problems offer opportunities for combining sabotage with local strikes and disorders. The Army and the police have been actively suppressing Communism and are considered able to check organized sabotage. Its incidence, however, remains probable.

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*BOLIVIA: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

Existing Communist capabilities for sabotage are slight. The number of Communists is small. There is no militant Communist organization. Communist influence in politico-social situations is relatively ineffective; in combination with anti-government parties, however, Communists might be able to bring about the government's fall and thus produce an unstable condition favorable to sabotage. The present Bolivian administration has hitherto countered threats from extreme Right and Left opposition by declaring a state of siege and employing special security measures. The Bolivian tin industry and its relation to US requirements provides, however, a desirable and vulnerable target. Consequently, even occasional acts of sabotage in Bolivia would have as crippling an effect as well-planned attempts in other countries.

*The estimate is agreed, but the Department of State substantiating statement differs.

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BRITISH GUIANA: No sabotage indicated.

No Communist organization is known to exist in British Guiana. The bauxite industry, linked with Canadian production, provides a significant and desirable target. Local security forces are entirely capable of dealing with any attempt to organize an internal effort against this industry.

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CHILE: Sabotage probably to be expected.

The Communist Party, outlawed in 1948, is estimated to number 40,000/50,000 members. It has retained effective control of the Federation of Miners and is infiltrated among railroad, port, electrical, and telephone workers. The internal security forces are considered able to prevent extensive and coordinated damage, but initial and planned attempts are probable in view of the difficulty of guarding widely dispersed facilities and an extended transportation system.

*COLOMBIA: Sabotage probably to be expected.

Communist strength is small and divided between two groups, both of which support the USSR in spite of their mutual antagonism. Nevertheless, Communist influence is important in the oil unions and the National Federation of Workers. Communists have indicated that oil production would be the main target of sabotage efforts. Nevertheless, the Communists have not shown great capability to promote successful strikes and damage from sabotage or strikes would not be great.

*The estimate is agreed, but the Department of State substantiating statement differs.

*CURACAO AND ARUBA: Sporadic sabotage only.

There is no significant Communist influence among local labor. Local security measures, both governmental and on the part of oil companies, are efficient in checking the influx of agents and are considered adequate. The situation is generally unfavorable for sabotage attempts by local people. However, the oil refineries constitute a significant and desirable target and direct sabotage attempts by specially trained saboteurs can be expected.

*Department of State estimates "No sabotage indicated."

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*ECUADOR: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

There are some Communists, particularly among the oil workers and port workers in Ecuador. These might attempt sabotage, or at least aid Soviet agents in such operations. The army may be unreliable as a security force. It is not considered that any significant damage could be done to essential US strategic interests.

*Department of State estimates "Sabotage probably to be expected."

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PARAGUAY: Sporadic sabotage only.

The Communist Party is outlawed. The Government and Army have communistically inclined groups under control. Opportunity for incidental sabotage is continually provided by political instability, but the absence of significant targets makes this opportunity comparatively unimportant.

PERU: Sporadic sabotage only.

The now-outlawed Communist Party never had great influence and was divided into two factions. The present strength of the orthodox party consists of its influence among petroleum workers and among miners, stevedores, and railroad workers. The dissidents are strongest among construction and motor transport workers. There has been a vacuum in labor leadership since the government suppressed the largest left-wing party, APRA, which controlled the major labor federation, but the Communists have been able to take little advantage of this opening. Security forces, in spite of the political instability of Peru, are considered effective to control Communist expansion and to prevent a coordinated sabotage effort.

SURINAM: No sabotage indicated.

There is no evidence of any Communist group in Surinam, or of any Communist influence in the labor movement. The bauxite industry provides, however, a significant and desirable target. Local security forces are entirely capable of dealing with any attempt to organize an internal effort against this industry.

*TRINIDAD: Sporadic sabotage only.

No organized Communist Party exists, though individual Communists are known to be present. Their capabilities are worth noting only in conjunction with the special consideration noted below. Security forces are adequate and capable of prompt and effective counter measures. However, the Trinidad oil refineries constitute a significant and desirable target, and direct sabotage attempts by trained saboteurs must be kept under consideration.

*Department of State estimates "No sabotage indicated."

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VENEZUELA: Sabotage probably to be expected.

The Communist Party has an estimated strength of 17,000. It has numerous sympathizers and two well-distributed press organs. The Party is particularly strong in the labor unions covering lake-tanker fleet, Caracas transport, the telegraph system, ports, and certain oil fields of Eastern and Western Venezuela. The present political confusion affords the Communist Party an opportunity to penetrate still further the labor movement. Security forces have shown to date an excellent capacity to stop strikes and prevent sabotage. Improvement in these respects should result from the cooperation that is being planned by the government, the oil companies, and the US.

AFRICA

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AFRICA

- (a) BELGIAN CONGO: No sabotage indicated.

Although desirable targets exist in connection with strategic materials, no serious Communist penetration has yet been reported. There is no native nationalist movement and the population generally offers little opening for Communist exploitation. Security forces are particularly alert and adequate.

- (b) MOZAMBIQUE: No sabotage indicated.

No Communist Party exists, and Portuguese control over the entrance of foreigners is so rigid and well-enforced that the appearance of organizers is not considered likely. There is no native nationalist movement. The colony's port installations offer a desirable target.

- (c) MADAGASCAR: Sporadic sabotage only.

There are a few French-born Communists present and active in the colony. Their chief capability is the encouragement of native revolt and nationalism. Existing security forces are considered adequate in present circumstances.

- (d) BRITISH EAST AFRICA: Sporadic sabotage only.

No Communist groups are presently active. Opportunities for Communist exploitation are provided, however, by racial antagonism and social grievances - especially in Kenya; but there is no evidence that any effort has been made to develop this cover. Vital rail and port installations offer vulnerable and desirable targets. Internal security forces are considered presently adequate.

(e) GOLD COAST: No sabotage indicated.

Economic discontent and growing nationalism offers opportunities for Communist exploitation, but an investigation of recent riots revealed no significant Communist influence at work. Security forces are considered to be adequate in present circumstances.

(f) NIGERIA: No sabotage indicated.

Though nationalist feeling is strong and well organized, there is no evidence that it has been influenced by active Communist organizers. There is no evidence of Communist penetration in the colony. Security forces are considered adequate in present circumstances.

(g) SIERRA LEONE: No sabotage indicated.

No factors exist which suggest any sabotage capabilities.

(h) NORTHERN RHODESIA: No sabotage indicated.

No important Communist groups or activities have yet been reported.

(i) SOUTHERN RHODESIA: No sabotage indicated.

No Communist groups or activities have yet been reported. No significant opportunities for Communist penetration exist. Security forces are more than adequate. The rail link with Mozambique offers a desirable target.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

The native Moslem population and their leaders do not normally respond to Communist doctrine, but their grievances have been and can be exploited by the Communist Party through strikes, public disorders, and appeals to nationalism.

(a) ALGERIA: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

The Communist Party is small and its present leadership is incompetent and undergoing reorganization. Its principal available instrument of action is the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs (CGT), which includes the majority of organized labor and frequently follows the Paris leadership in calling strikes. Communists and sympathizers, usually specialized workers of European origin, are concentrated in and around the naval installation of Mers-el-Kebir, Oran, and Arzew, and the air installations at La Senia and Tafaraoui. The recent US-French verbal agreement respecting the use of military installations is known to the Communist Party and provides a stimulus and targets for sabotage. Civil installations in Algeria are not particularly vulnerable to significant sabotage. Existing military and security forces are considered adequate for present circumstances.

(b) MOROCCO: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

Communist Party membership is smaller than in Algeria, but leadership is more effective. There are hard-core groups and sympathetic technicians at Port Lyantey and Casablanca. Stimulus to sabotage is provided by the presence of the US Naval Air Activity at Port Lyantey.

(NB: Planned sabotage at this installation was discovered and prevented in December 1948.) Civil installations are not particularly vulnerable. Existing military and security forces are considered adequate.

(c) TUNISIA: Sabotage possibly to be expected.

The Tunisian Communist Party has the smallest membership of any in North Africa, but the most competent leadership. Its principal vehicle has been the Union des Syndicats. Significant capabilities are present since European Communist skilled workers are concentrated at naval installations in Bizerte and Ferryville and the air installations of Sidi Ahmed and El Aouina. Civil installations are not particularly vulnerable. Existing military and security forces are considered adequate.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: Sporadic sabotage only.

The Communist Party is small and weak. Its membership is scattered in widely separated urban centers. Its leaders are for the most part visionary intellectuals and not trained militants. Its influence in politics and trade unions is negligible, for the opposition of the white electorate is vigorous and often fanatical. Security forces are vigilant and more than adequate in existing circumstances.

However, since repression by a small white minority is building up racial antagonism, the situation requires constant attention. Communist refusal to recognize a color line provides a potentially strong weapon. The strategic importance of the Union's extractive industries invites plans for sabotage.

EUROPE

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SPAIN: Sporadic sabotage only.

The illegal Communist Party is believed to be no larger than 20,000 and is relatively ineffective. Police action prevented its effective reorganization after the Civil War and has continued to make difficult the coordination of separated groups. Social tensions, which might be expected to provide openings for Communist exploitation, are in fact neutralized by an active fear of Communism and by the influence of the Catholic Church. Competing Anarchist, Syndicalist, and Socialist influence over labor lessen the Communist capacity to exploit grievances.

The physical factors of concentration and isolated key installations provide theoretically favorable opportunities for sabotage. The following examples are noted,

a. Concentrations of extractive industries in the North; of heavy industries in the Bilbao and Barcelona areas; and of central control of telephone and telegraph facilities in Madrid.

b. Isolated key installations -- hydroelectric system and railroad tunnels and bridges.

Existing military and security forces are considered adequate to maintain the advantages they now possess.

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ASIA MINOR

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IRAN: Sabotage probably to be expected.

Actual Communist Party members are fewer than 500, but their activities are supplemented by sympathizers from the Tudeh Party, recently outlawed. This Party has extensively penetrated railway personnel, the truck drivers guild, and to an unknown degree the petroleum industry. These three industries are vital. Their prolonged interruption by sabotage would have serious economic consequences and affect the stability of the government. Their destruction by direct acts of sabotage would be strategically significant.

The initial success of any broadly planned sabotage is possible, particularly in the transport industries. Short of an actual Soviet armed follow-up, it would, however, be checked by prompt and ruthless counter measures on the part of the Iranian Army aided by tribesmen. The petroleum industry has a competent security force of its own and is probably able to deal with even the initial stages of a general sabotage effort.

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KUWAIT: No sabotage indicated.

There has been no sign of any Communist organization in Kuwait. The Sheikh cooperates fully with the British Political Agent to exclude undesirables. Local labor is reasonably content and not responsive to Communist propaganda. Significant installations are concentrated in one region and local security forces -- the police of the Sheikdom and Oil Company security police -- are considered capable of dealing with all attempts at sabotage.

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SAUDI ARABIA: No sabotage indicated.

There is no Communist Party in Saudi Arabia and no Communist activity has been noted. The only opening for Communist penetration is among skilled petroleum workers, but the possibility of sabotage is checked by the security measures of the Arabian American Oil Co. The political, economic, and social situation offers no particular opportunity for Communist action.

The Dhahran area, containing the oil fields and the US Air Force Base, is the only area in which sabotage operations would be of any value. In this region, security forces, consisting of Saudi police units, Oil Company security police, and US Air Force personnel, are amply fitted to deal with all attempts at sabotage.

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TURKEY: Sporadic sabotage only.

The illegal Communist Party is negligible and its underground activities are under close surveillance. The nation is traditionally suspicious of Russia and is fundamentally antipathetic to Communist propaganda. The strategic location of Turkey makes it inevitable, however, that individual acts of planned sabotage will be attempted. Internal security forces are in full control and will so continue.

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ASIA

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BURMA: Sabotage now in progress.
Can be definitely expected to continue.

There are two important Communist groups in Burma, both in active rebellion against the government. Both gained experience in underground and sabotage activities during the Japanese occupation. General disaffection and a highly unstable political situation offer opportunities for Communist influence and sabotage. Internal security forces, in view of the state of near anarchy which prevails, have lost effective control.

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Regions of active or passive civil war -- a special category to which the terms of the problem are not applicable.

(a) CHINA

The Chinese Communists control North China. Their military forces are capable of over-running South China and eventually all of the country if current peace negotiations fail; or, alternately, if negotiations succeed, the Communists are in a position to dominate any government that emerges.

Special note is taken of Taiwan. Chinese Communists can and probably will exploit the local situation between Taiwanese and Nationalist authorities by encouraging sabotage of utilities, communications, industry, and air facilities.

(b) KOREA

The country is at present divided into two parts. The northern Communist government has partisans conducting guerrilla-type operations against the southern Republic. In addition, systematic sabotage is directed against the economy of the Republic. Short of war, Republican forces can probably continue to control the situation. In the event of war, the Communist north, if assisted by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, can probably over-run the Republic.

(c) INDONESIA

The situation in Indonesia does not permit an estimate. The small minority of Communists, dispersed by Republican action at the end of 1948, is now engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Dutch along with the bulk of Indonesian Nationalists. Since, under present conditions, it

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is impossible to maintain security, Communist groups have both time and opportunity to improve their organization and to increase their strength. Prolongation of the present conflict will increase Communist capabilities.

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CEYLON: Sporadic sabotage only.

There are three Communist parties in Ceylon. Bitter disputes over doctrine and leadership reduce their effectiveness. Communist parliamentary strength has fallen during the first year of Ceylonese independence. There is little likelihood of the Communist position being much improved in the near future. Little more than incidental sabotage, centered at Colombo, is to be expected.

INDIA: Sabotage definitely to be expected.

The hard core membership of the Communist Party is unevenly distributed through India, with concentrations in urban centers and restricted agricultural areas. Its leaders are able and experienced in political tactics as well as militant action. Internal security forces, tested by the recent railway strike, proved themselves effective. It is considered that they would be overtaxed, however, by a comprehensively planned sabotage effort. Opportunities to exploit political divisions and mass grievances are numerous and "cover" can easily be developed for sabotage. It can be expected that as hostilities approach efforts at disruptive sabotage will be made and that these efforts will be temporarily successful.

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Malaya: Sabotage now in progress.
Can be definitely expected to continue.

The Communist Party has been underground since July 1948. It has provided some leadership for isolated guerrilla bands engaged in sabotage. Ninety percent of its militants are Chinese. Its influence in labor unions has been reduced by the action of British authorities. Communist success in China has produced a certain cautious tolerance of Communist activities among the large Chinese population of Malaya. Security forces, currently numbering 100,000 UK and Colonial troops, police, and auxiliaries, have been able to protect centers of population but have been unable to prevent sporadic attacks on railways, power lines, rubber estates, and tin mines.

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NEW CALEDONIA: No sabotage indicated.

Local French authorities, strongly anti-Communist, have complete and effective control. A small, self-styled "Communist" group exists, but is without effective leadership. It is considered that local security measures are adequate.

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11 April, 1949

PAKISTAN: No sabotage expected in West Pakistan.
Sabotage probable in East Pakistan.

The partition of India completely disorganized Communist leadership in West Pakistan, and the newly-formed Communist Party of Pakistan operating in this area has made very little headway against strong Muslim nationalism. There is, therefore, no evidence of significant capability for sabotage in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan the Communist Party was not adversely affected by partition and though currently weak can be expected to increase in strength and number under the conditions of dissatisfaction currently existing among East Bengalis. Given the stimulus derived from approaching hostilities, the Party in East Pakistan will be capable of and can be expected to effect considerable disruption of the economic life of the area.

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REMARKS: Sporadic sabotage only.

Communist leaders control an armed agrarian movement, the Hukbalahap, and have some influence in labor unions operating public services and land transport. Hukbalahap guerrillas successfully resisted Japanese authority during the occupation and have continued this type of operation in Central Luzon against large concentrations of Philippine Government troops. The Government is considered able to contain the Hukbalahap movement and restrict the activities of Communist leaders.

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SMM: Sporadic sabotage only.

Communist capabilities are essentially limited to influence over Chinese labor in the Bangkok area. The labor force primarily affected is employed in port work, rice milling, tin, and rubber production. The Communists have little influence with the Siamese population. Present limited capabilities may be increased by Chinese Communist successes in China.

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